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Concepts of Policing during the Russian Revolution, 1917-18 
Murray Frame 
One of the immediate consequences of the February Revolution, especially in Petrograd, was 
the rapid and almost complete dissolution of the tsarist police system.  Yet none of the 
revolutionaries envisaged post-tsarist Russia without some kind of police system, and even 
before the final collapse of the old regime efforts were underway to assign some of the basic 
tasks of policing to a range of improvised organisations.  In order to emphasise the break with 
the past, the term ‘police’ (politsiia) was abandoned in favour of ‘militia’ (militsiia).  
However, there was no single unified ‘militia’ during 1917, and although the word was 
regularly used by contemporaries in the singular tense, in reality it described a variety of 
separate organisations including:  a largely theoretical state militia that the Provisional 
Government hoped would replace the tsarist police;  autonomous municipal (or city) militias 
established by local dumas;  voluntary workers’ militias, usually linked to individual factories 
or city districts;  and, by spring 1917, Red Guard units.  Workers’ militias and Red Guard 
units were usually formed spontaneously -- in other words, without any central coordination -
- and the Provisional Government found it impossible to wield any influence over them.  
Despite its paramilitary connotations and the fact that many local militias were armed, the 
militia was, for the most part, regarded as a regular civilian police force, not as a substitute 
army;  of the main political forces in 1917, only the Bolsheviks conceived of the militia as 
‘the people in arms’. 
The complex process of militia formation and organisation during the Russian 
Revolution has been explored in great detail by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, V. I. Startsev, and Rex 
Wade, among others, and their work forms an essential starting point for any study of 
policing during 1917, particularly as a factor in understanding the shifting loci of power in 
Petrograd.  This article focuses on a related but more specific question:  to what extent did the 
revolution transform ideas about the purpose of the police system, i.e. its functions and 
scope?  By its very nature the revolution created an opportunity to separate past from present, 
to reinvent the structures, functions, and ideological rationales of a whole range of political, 
social, economic and cultural institutions.  The swift demise of the tsarist police presented 
contemporary political actors with the challenge of defining the functions and scope of the 
militia as a new civilian police system.  What would it be for?  To what extent were the 
purposes of formal policing reconceptualised? 
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To explore these questions, the article draws upon press and pamphlet commentary 
about the militia during 1917, as well as official statements and statutes issued by the 
Provisional Government and Bolshevik authorities.  The question of the militia’s purpose 
overlapped with debates about its organisational structure and its relationship to the state, as 
will become apparent, but the primary aim here is to highlight the question of functions and 
scope.  It will be suggested that, despite the political radicalism of the revolution -- and 
indeed the potentially radical implications of a centrifugal militia-style police force -- 
concepts of policing after the February Revolution were quite conventional.  Even the 
Bolsheviks, despite conceptualising the militia as ‘the people in arms’, ultimately legislated 
for a civilian police force that was not fundamentally different from its predecessors, at least 
in terms of its formally ascribed functions.  Moreover, ideas about civilian policing in Russia 
during the revolution echoed some long-standing European models, and it is important to 
acknowledge this transnational context.  The article begins with a consideration of that wider 
perspective, and after a brief overview of policing before the revolution it then considers the 
immediate reasons for the emergence of militias during the February Revolution.  It then 
looks in turn at key conceptualisations of the militia that were debated during 1917.  These 
are drawn from statements found in publications of the Kadets, the Provisional Government, 
the Mensheviks, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and the Bolsheviks (although it should be 
emphasised that, whilst each statement reflected a particular view of the militia, it did not 
constitute a formal party position).  The article concludes with a discussion of the Bolshevik 
regime’s first full decree on the militia, promulgated in October 1918.  The focus is on the 
short-term impact of the revolution (1917-18), rather than longer-term consequences for 
policing during the early Soviet period (1920-30s). 
Historians agree that the development of modern policing has been so contingent 
upon local circumstance, and its functions and organisational forms so varied, that it is 
practically impossible to generalise about its origins and purposes (Barrie, p. 444;  Finnane, 
p. 457).  Here I want to highlight two particular models of ‘policing’ that help to 
contextualise the efforts of the new Russian authorities and other political actors to define the 
scope and purpose of the militia during 1917-18.  The first is the idea of policing as public 
administration, which developed in Europe from the seventeenth century onwards as part of 
the efforts of absolutist states to regulate their societies and organise their resources more 
effectively and systematically.  The concept of ‘police’ in that context was influenced by 
Cameralism -- the science of public administration -- and was broadly coterminous with the 
rational organization of a polity.  The earliest summary of this idea was Nicolas de La Mare’s 
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Traité de police (Paris, 1722), which enumerated the basic principles of what Marc Raeff 
later termed the ‘well-ordered police state’ (Raeff 1975, p. 1235).  The essential idea of the 
‘well-ordered police state’ was that the state should take responsibility for the welfare of its 
population, which in turn meant that it should be more active than passive, more 
interventionist than reactive. 
In this conception, policing encompassed an extraordinarily wide range of activities.  
William Blackstone’s definition of ‘police’ in his Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(1765) was so broad that one scholar claimed that it covered ‘the entire domestic policy of a 
nation’ (Fosdick, p. 3).  A good illustration of this breadth is the remit of the first Russian 
police force, established by Peter the Great in St Petersburg in 1718 -- the first time the word 
‘police’ (politsiia) was used officially in the Russian empire -- and modelled on the system 
pioneered in Paris under Louis XIV.  In addition to enforcing city sanitation and building 
standards, the new force was required to ‘inspect foods, test weights and measures for 
accuracy, and preserve the tidy appearance of civilized life’;  its very first assignment was ‘to 
hunt wolves and put out fires’ (Monas, p. 363).  Viewed from the perspective of 
Enlightenment Europe, therefore, modern policing was closely connected to administrative 
tasks defined by the supervisory Cameralist state. 
The second model is the ‘Peelite’ one, associated with the London Metropolitan 
Police force established by Robert Peel in 1829 and adopted in other parts of the English-
speaking world such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.  The theoretical 
essence of this model is its focus on the interests of citizens rather than the state:  it posits a 
decentralised police force that derives its legitimacy from the people (the idea of ‘policing by 
consent’).  Its primary function, moreover, is to protect the safety of the public, rather than to 
carry out state-administrative tasks (Johansen, pp. 500-1).  As Clive Emsley observes, Whig 
historians of British policing argue that the Peelite police were established ‘because of an 
awareness of rising crime and increasing public disorder’ (Emsley 2011, p.  xii).  One of the 
most forceful advocates of this position was Charles Reith, who, between 1938 and 1956, 
wrote several books about the history of British policing.  Reith argued that industrialisation 
and urbanisation led to growing disorder that was only brought under control by the creation 
of a ‘Preventive Police’ in the nineteenth century (Reith 1943).  Whilst these two models 
impose a level of abstraction on the history of policing that masks a far more complex reality 
(Emsley 1999), they nevertheless represent significant ways in which policing has been 
conceptualised, and both are to be found in the discourse about the militia during the Russian 
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Revolution.  That discourse can therefore be situated in the wider context of policing history, 
and not simply in the dynamics of the 1917 revolution. 
 Prior to 1917 civilian policing in Russia developed largely along the same lines as 
most other European countries.  The police force was a centralised state organ, administered 
from the early nineteenth century by a Department of Police under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs.  The formal responsibilities of the police were broad and 
included maintaining public order, ensuring the safety of the population, dealing with 
complaints, and tracking down deserters and people who avoided work (Potemkina, p. 480);  
in other words, the police system was primarily a public administration apparatus.  The 
investigation of specific crimes against individuals (murder, rape) and property (theft) was a 
relatively low priority, as was the case in most of Europe, with the partial exception of Britain 
after 1829.  The first detective department with the express purpose of investigating crimes 
was established in St Petersburg in 1866, but it was not until 1908 that others appeared 
beyond the imperial capital (Abbott 1977, p. 74; Rubtsov, pp. 164-65).  Proposals to 
streamline its responsibilities were occasionally put forward (Abbott 1973, pp. 296-99), but 
as the head of the Department of Police M. I. Trusevich observed in 1908, the police force 
remained ‘the universal apparatus for fulfilling the tasks of every other branch of 
government’ (Weissman, p. 56).   
The emphasis on the police as an instrument of the state was reinforced by the activity 
of the political security police (as distinct from the civilian police), which until 1880 was the 
remit of a separate organisation.  Between 1826 and 1880, political and security policing was 
carried out by the Third Section, staffed mainly by gendarmes (i.e., units of soldiers who 
remained in the pay of the army but whose duties overlapped with civilian matters).  In 1880 
the Third Section was replaced by the Division for the Protection of Order and Public 
Security, which now came under the auspices of the Department of Police.  The new Division 
oversaw the work of a series of security divisions (okhrannye otdeleniia) across the empire -- 
still staffed by gendarmes -- which became known colloquially as the ‘okhrana’ or 
‘okhranka’.  Although the regular and security branches of the police apparatus were now 
merged under one department, their personnel and functions generally remained separate.   
By 1900 the Department of Police employed 47,866 personnel.  There were 21,533 
regular patrolmen and approximately 11,000 security police personnel (Weissman, p. 47; 
Leggett, p. xxiii).  By the eve of the First World War, civilian police numbers in urban 
centres were broadly comparable to those of other major European cities;  Berlin and Paris 
had marginally more policemen per number of inhabitants than St Petersburg and in that 
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sense were more ‘policed’ (Fosdick, pp. 401-2).  The Russian countryside, however, had 
small numbers of police relative to the size of its population:  by 1900 rural areas were 
policed by a total of 1582 constables (stanovoi pristav) and 6874 sergeants (uriadnik), who 
were responsible for a widely scattered population of about 90 million people, meaning that, 
on average, each policeman was responsible for more than ten thousand people (Weissman, 
p.49). 
The events of the February Revolution demonstrated that, although tsarist Russia’s 
civilian police force was not especially large by comparative standards, it had a reputation as 
a steadfast pillar and hated symbol of the old order.  The British consular official in Moscow 
at the time, Robert Bruce Lockhart, later recalled that the police ‘were especially hated 
because none of them had been sent to the war’ (Bruce Lockhart, p. 24).  This hostility was 
reinforced during the early days and weeks of the revolution as the police made sporadic 
attempts to quash the popular uprising in Petrograd, which in turn generated a wave of attacks 
against them.  As the mood of insurrection escalated, individual policemen began to 
disappear from their stationary posts across the capital.  They remained visible in patrols for 
slightly longer but were soon ‘disarmed in many places without offering serious resistance’ 
(Sukhanov, pp. 16, 19, 26;  Shliapnikov, p. 85).  A pivotal moment came on 26 February 
when troops from the Pavlovsky Regiment, which was on the verge of siding with the 
revolution, clashed with mounted police who were trying to disperse a crowd by shooting at it 
(Sukhanov, pp. 28-9).  Some of the last okhrana reports spoke of ‘attacks against the police’ 
in response to such incidents (Browder and Kerensky, pp. 34-36).  In the very first issue of 
Izvestiia, the Petrograd Soviet, in an appeal to soldiers, claimed that ‘remnants of the police, 
Black Hundreds and other scoundrels’ were positioned on the roofs of houses and apartments 
and should be removed by ‘a well-aimed bullet or regular attack’.1  Police stations and 
okhrana archives were ransacked, and by the time Nicholas II abdicated on 2 March the 
police system had all but evaporated in the capital (Musaev, pp. 11-12;  Hasegawa 1973, p. 
303).  Its collapse elsewhere in the former empire soon followed, although the process was 
less sudden.    
For both the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government, as well as for the 
myriad spontaneously-formed militias in the capital and elsewhere, the predominant reason 
for seeking quickly to replace the tsarist police was a concern for order (poriadok).  ‘Order’ 
in this context generally meant guarding against crime and ensuring the safety of citizens.  
                                                 
1 Izvestiia, 28 February 1917 (No. 1), p. 2. 
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The February Revolution was accompanied by a dramatic upsurge in crime, especially in 
Petrograd and Moscow, a consequence of the general collapse of authority, as well as the 
release from prison of hundreds of criminals alongside political prisoners (Hasegawa, 1992;  
Musaev, p. 25;  Koval’, pp. 6-7).  In the first issue of Izvestiia, the Soviet called upon soldiers 
to carry out some basic policing functions, imploring them not to allow ‘hooligans to hurt 
peaceful citizens’ or to ‘ransack shops or rob apartments’.2  A supplement to the paper, 
published on the same day, expressed alarm at the spread of hooliganism and robbery.  
‘Gangs of hooligans’ were starting to roam the city and rob ‘shops and the property of 
inhabitants’.  ‘The revolutionary people and the army in no circumstances can permit this’;  
hooligans must be arrested and despatched to the Commandant of the State Duma 
(presumably Boris A. Engel’gardt, head of the newly-formed Military Commission of the 
State Duma).  Concern was also expressed about ‘aimless shooting’ in the streets, which was 
deemed a waste of the ammunition that might be required in the struggle to consolidate the 
revolution.  Revolutionary patrols were called upon to disarm the perpetrators.3   
It should be noted that, although the Soviet initially called upon the army and -- rather 
more nebulously -- the ‘revolutionary people’ to take responsibility for the restoration of 
order, the use of soldiers for policing was only intended as an immediate short-term measure 
born of alarm at the apparent breakdown of order.  It would become evident during the 
following weeks and months that the Soviet hoped to maintain a clear distinction between the 
role of the army -- including armed defence of the revolution -- and civilian policing.  At 
approximately the same time as its appeal to soldiers, at 4 a.m. on the morning of 28 February 
the Soviet Executive Committee called upon factory workers to establish militias consisting 
of 100 people for every thousand workers, and whilst nothing was said about their purpose, it 
soon became clear that militias would function primarily as localised police forces.4  
Almost simultaneously, the Provisional Committee of the State Duma -- which was 
about to be reformed as the Provisional Government -- issued its own call for the formation 
of a militia.  During the early hours of 1 March, the Military Commission asked Dmitry A. 
Kryzhanovskii -- an architect and deputy of the Petrograd municipal duma -- to ‘Organize the 
militia on behalf of the public organizations of Petrograd, for the purpose of maintaining 
order on the streets of Petrograd’ (Browder and Kerensky, p. 57).  In fact, this request simply 
‘rubber-stamped’ a decision of the municipal duma the previous day to appoint 
                                                 
2 Izvestiia, 28 February 1917 (No. 1), p. 2. 
3 Izvestiia, 28 February 1917, supplement (pribavlenie) to No. 1, p. 2. 
4 Izvestiia, 28 February 1917 (No. 1), p. 2. 
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Kryzhanovskii as commander of the municipal militia (Wade, p. 44).  On the same day 
Mikhail A. Karaulov, a member of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, issued 
guidelines for military units and the militia regarding arrests.  These guidelines provide an 
insight into the specific kinds of disorder that concerned the Provisional Committee at that 
particular moment (they are less valuable as an insight into how the new authorities 
envisaged the role of the militia in general).  They provided a list of categories of people who 
were to be arrested immediately upon apprehension: 
 
1)  inebriates; 
2)  burglars, arsonists, persons shooting into the air and, in general, disrupting 
peace and order in the capital; 
3)  those who offer resistance to persons with any special powers delegated to 
them by the Provisional Government [sic], or to persons employed for the 
protection of the town; 
4)  all ranks of the regular and secret police and the corps of gendarmes; 
5)  all persons who carry out searches of private residences or arrests of private 
persons and, also, of army personnel, without having any special authorization 
from the Provisional Government for such [action]. 
 
Referring to the release of non-political prisoners and their apparent contribution to the 
sudden growth in crime, Karaulov stated:  ‘These murderers, thieves, and burglars, disguising 
themselves in uniforms of the lower [military] ranks, are brazenly bursting into private  
residences, carrying out illegal searches, robbing, raping, and bringing on terror.’  All were to 
be arrested, and ‘shot in the event of resistance’ (Browder and Kerensky, pp. 61-2). 
Karaulov’s injunction that officials of the tsarist police were to be arrested prompted a 
more pragmatic approach from the Provisional Government, which announced on 4 March 
that, as long as they ‘were not compromised by their previous activities’, Petrograd police 
officials were not to be arrested (Browder and Kerensky, p. 163).  Lest there was any 
lingering doubt that the old police system was at an end, however, the Provisional 
Government also announced on 4 March that the okhrana, the gendarmes and the railway 
police were to be abolished and their employees enlisted for military service (Browder and 
Kerensky, p. 192).  This was followed on 10 March by the formal abolition of the 
Department of Police.  In its place the Provisional Government established a ‘temporary 
administration for the public police [obshchestvennaia politsiia]’, as part of the Ministry of 
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Internal Affairs, for ‘the protection of the person and property of citizens’ (a rare occurrence 
of the word ‘politsiia’ to describe such organisations in the post-February period).5 
The urgency to organise a replacement for the tsarist police therefore stemmed mainly 
from a determination to combat a sudden wave of crime and ‘hooliganism’.  Nikolai 
Sukhanov suggested that the response was successful:  ‘It was to them [the new voluntary 
militias] that Petersburg was so greatly indebted for the swift restoration of order and 
security’ (Sukhanov, p. 98).  Subsequent research, however, has shown persuasively that 
crime remained a major social problem in the capital throughout 1917, and that the new 
militias struggled to deal with it (Hasegawa, 1992).  Nevertheless, it is clear that the militia, 
in its different guises, was initially conceived only as a ‘preventive police’ for the purpose of 
counteracting a dramatic rise in disorder.  In the months after the February Revolution, as the 
authorities endeavoured to impose a unitary structure on the myriad militia organisations, 
differing views about what should be the functions and scope of policing in post-tsarist 
Russia became evident.  The remainder of this article will look at key conceptualisations of 
the militia that circulated during the revolution, based on materials relating to the Kadets, the 
Provisional Government, the Mensheviks, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and the Bolsheviks.  
The first general statement on policing by the Kadets (Constitutional Democrats) -- 
the dominant party in the first Provisional Government -- following the collapse of tsarism 
was written by N. A. Lenskii and appeared in the party’s newspaper Rech’ on 14 March.  
Lenskii stated that an essential task of the new militia should be protection of the emerging 
‘legal order’ (pravoporiadok) and the ‘personal and property rights of citizens’.  But he also 
argued for the reestablishment of a professional police force with a wider range of 
responsibilities.  Whilst the collapse of the old police system had compelled people to 
organise various kinds of voluntary militias to protect their property, this did not absolve the 
authorities of the responsibility to establish a more permanent policing organization.  In 
Lenskii’s view, a militia system that was too variegated and reliant upon volunteers -- who 
would gradually drift away because they had other occupations -- would be incapable of 
‘carrying out, in the interests of citizens and the new state structure, the various functions that 
lay with the old police, the functions of a so-called executive police’.  Echoing the Cameralist 
idea of police, Lenskii alluded to a range of administrative tasks that, by implication, he 
believed should be the remit of the militia:  ‘Our everyday life is closely linked with the need 
to have on various occasions different certificates, testimonies, information.  On the other 
                                                 
5 Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporiazhenii pravitel’stva, 13 April 1917 (No. 79), p. 668. 
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hand, there are instances when all the organs of governmental and public authority need to 
issue requests and information for the notification of citizens’.  He acknowledged that reform 
of the police would take time, but in the meantime the municipal militia should not only 
safeguard ‘order and safety’, it should also assume the functions of an ‘executive police’.  
Lenskii therefore envisioned a new police organisation that would serve the interests of the 
state as well as its citizens, and whose scope would be similar to that of the tsarist police;  the 
key difference would be the new militia’s regard for legal order.   
The assertion of a statist view on policing was no doubt partly a reaction to Kadet 
anxiety about the diffuse and centrifugal character of voluntary militias (and what that meant 
for the Provisional Government’s ability to stamp its authority on the country), as well as a 
general conviction that a liberal state should have an effective police force under its 
command.  In this respect, Lenskii expressed concern about the democratic nature of the 
militias.  ‘Excessive collegiality’, he suggested, could hinder the ‘initiative and energy’ of 
militiamen in their work, and discipline could only be guaranteed if the militia’s leadership 
was not bound in any way by the ‘elective principle’.  The head of the militia should 
therefore be appointed by the municipal duma.  Pre-empting any criticism that his vision of 
policing for the new Russia was not very ‘radical’, Lenskii drew a comparison with Britain.  
Until now, he suggested, Russia and Britain were ‘two polar opposites’ in terms of how their 
municipal police forces were organized.  ‘In this regard we have now come further than not 
only the countries between [Russia and Britain] but further than even Britain’ because, 
claimed Lenskii, the London Metropolitan police force was not a proper municipal force but 
subordinate to the state.  He therefore concluded:  ‘it should be clear that the experience of 
people who have known the blessing of freedom for longer should oblige us to be especially 
careful in resolving this issue [policing] and not to sacrifice the interests of protecting the 
new order for the sake of falsely understood principles of democratism’.6 
Lenskii’s position on policing was reflected in the essential elements of the 
Provisional Government’s statute on the formal establishment of a new militia, which was 
ratified by ministers on 17 April and published on 3 May.7  One aim of the statute was to 
establish central governmental authority over the functions of policing and to give coherence 
to the wide array of local militias.  However, the extent to which this was achieved in practice 
was limited;  the Provisional Government appears not to have gained significant control over 
the profusion of centrifugal policing organisations during 1917, and the extent to which the 
                                                 
6 Rech’, 14 March 1917, p. 3.   
7 Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporiazhenii pravitel’stva, 3 May 1917 (No. 97), pp. 837-43. 
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statute was acknowledged and implemented at local levels is unclear (indeed unlikely).  Its 
importance here lies in its encapsulation of how the Provisional Government conceptualised 
and envisaged the role of Russia’s new police system.   
According to the statute, the militia was to be an ‘executive organ of state power in 
the localities’, coming under the ‘direct authority of zemstva and municipal public 
administrations’, who were to appoint (and dismiss) local heads of militia.  Local authorities 
would therefore have a key responsibility for militia organisation, and heads of militia would 
report to them.  At the same time, however, the statute emphasised that ultimate authority 
over the militia resided with the Minister of Internal Affairs, who was responsible not only 
for the ‘general direction of the militia’s work’ but also for the allocation of its budget at 
local levels. 
Section 4 of the statute set out the ‘duties and powers of the militia’, and they 
underlined the Provisional Government’s view of the militia as an ‘executive police’ with a 
broad remit to carry out various administrative tasks on behalf of the state.  The first article of 
the section (article 18) reflected the primary motivation for the rapid formation of militias 
during the February Revolution:  ‘The militia protects public safety and order and defends 
everyone from any violence, injury and assault.’  Article 19, however, broadened the militia’s 
remit by referring not only to ‘public order and safety’ but also ‘matters of public welfare’, 
and it listed ten areas for which the militia was responsible: 
 
(1)  taking measures to end breaches of order, the law or binding decrees;  
(2)  timely notification of the population of orders issued by governmental and 
public authorities, and of announcements and notices issued by them; 
(3)  protection of the rights of civil freedom; 
(4)  assisting the organs of governmental and public authority in fulfilling their 
obligations; 
(5)  issuing of identity cards, and also all other certificates, information, notices 
and testimonies stipulated by active decrees, including attestations of poverty; 
(6)  maintenance of a population register in areas where such a register is 
established; 
(7)  drawing up of documents and reports about any accidents and acts of 
violence, as well as any other circumstances if required by citizens for the 
defence of their rights; […] 
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(8)  safeguarding order in public places, as well as protecting the good condition 
of roads, bridges, brushwood roads, streets, squares and so on, and 
supervising the traffic on them; 
(9)  taking measures for the maintenance of safety and order during fires, floods 
and other public disasters, as well as providing help at accidents, and 
(10)  requesting the assistance of citizens to render help in the event of public 
disasters and accidents.   
 
Other articles in this section of the statute outlined the militia’s role in criminal investigations 
and prosecutions, administrative matters relating to military personnel, and procedures 
relating to arrests and reporting. 
The emphasis in the Provisional Government’s legislation for a new police system 
therefore lay heavily on the requirements of the ‘well-ordered police state’.  In fact, article 23 
asserted that, in addition to duties already enumerated in the statute, ‘officials of the militia 
are obliged to carry out all legitimate requests of governmental and public authorities’.  This 
echoed the observation of Trusevich in 1908 (quoted above) to the effect that the police 
system was an administrative instrument for all aspects of government.  In this respect, the 
Provisional Government’s understanding of the general purposes of policing after the 
February Revolution was not significantly different from the wider continental European 
tradition, or indeed from the scope of civilian policing in tsarist Russia.  The model and remit 
described by the statute of 17 April corresponded to a standard European type.  And this 
underscored the extent to which the adoption of the term ‘militia’ by the Provisional 
Government was largely a gesture to the popular revolution and the proliferation of voluntary 
militias. 
It should be noted that, according to the statute’s preamble, the organisation of the 
militia in Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev and Odessa would be covered by special statutes.  This 
seems to have taken some time;  only on 14 July did Izvestiia report that the Provisional 
Government had approved the militia’s organisational structure in those cities.  Like 
elsewhere, the militia in Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev and Odessa would be an ‘executive organ 
of state authority’ but run directly by local authorities.  The only difference seems to have 
been that the municipal duma would be responsible for hiring and firing the head of the 
militia in those particular cities.8  In essence, this was no different from the arrangement that 
                                                 
8 Izvestiia, 14 July 1917, p. 6. 
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was intended to operate elsewhere, except that the original statute referred to zemstva and 
municipal public administrations rather than municipal dumas.  But the separate treatment 
probably reflected a more fraught debate about lines of authority over the militia in those 
cities.  In Petrograd, for example, the question of whether the Provisional Government or the 
municipal duma should exercise authority over the militia remained sharply contested for 
several months (Hasegawa 2001;  Kel’son 2, pp. 151-57).   
A different perspective on the purposes of policing following the collapse of tsarism 
can be found in the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary press.  Several of its contributors 
advocated a police force with a more democratic structure and a narrower remit than Lenskii 
and the Provisional Government supported, and that some of the voluntary militias claimed 
for themselves.  In its first comment on the issue, in an unattributed piece published on 8 
March, the Menshevik newspaper Rabochaia gazeta suggested that some comrades in the 
Petrograd Soviet were confusing ‘two concepts’ in the debates about a militia.  One concept 
was the notion of the ‘people in arms’ who would replace the army and defend the revolution 
from counter-revolutionary attacks from any remnants of the old regime.  According to the 
Menshevik newspaper, however, such a militia was unnecessary because the army had 
already sided with revolution.9  This point was reiterated by Rabochaia gazeta in late April 
when the Red Guard emerged, regarded by the Mensheviks as a Bolshevik continuation of 
the idea that the people -- or more specifically workers -- should be armed to defend the 
revolution.10 
The other concept was of the militia as a ‘civic police force’ or ‘civic guard’ that would 
replace the tsarist police -- described as having been ‘hostile to the people’ -- and would 
protect citizens ‘from robberies and excesses’ and so forth;  this, in fact, was an ‘urgent task’.  
The Provisional Government, pointed out Rabochaia gazeta, was already addressing this 
issue and had just announced that the police would be reformed into a militia, under the 
direction of local authorities (a position that was shortly to be enshrined in the statute of 17 
April).  The responsibility of this new organisation, at a time when it was ‘often difficult to 
distinguish friend from foe’, was considerable.  Consequently, militiamen should be well 
remunerated, of high moral standing, and ideally they should be elected. 
 
Only such a militia, relying on the absolute confidence of citizens, will have the 
authority it needs as a popular organ of power.  Only such a civic guard can 
                                                 
9 Rabochaia gazeta, 8 March 1917, p. 2. 
10 Rabochaia gazeta, 29 April 1917, pp. 1-2. 
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successfully fight against hooligans and agents provocateurs, against all the dark 
forces of reaction, [and] can guarantee safety on the streets and the order of 
normal life.11 
 
The elective principle contrasted with Lenskii’s scepticism about the appropriateness of 
democracy in the militia, as well as the stipulation of the Provisional Government’s statute 
that heads of militia should be appointed by local authorities, and that all other militiamen 
should be appointed by heads of militia. 
The lengthiest discussion of the militia to appear in Rabochaia gazeta was written by 
Vladimir M. Shakh, a Menshevik who had organised a militia in the Petrogradskii district of 
the capital (Wade, pp. 52-3).  His article, entitled ‘Police-Militia’, was printed in the 2 June 
issue of the newspaper and should therefore be understood in the context of the Provisional 
Government’s statute, published one month earlier.  Shakh made two arguments that were 
pertinent to the question of the militia’s functions and scope.  First of all, the police system 
should no longer have a political role like it did in tsarist times, when it was ‘the best 
instrument of authority and oppression, the best bulwark of autocracy’.  In Shakh’s 
estimation, which reflected a widely-held view amongst the revolutionary parties, ‘The only 
thing with which the police did not concern itself [before the February Revolution] was the 
safety of citizens…’  The militia, he argued, must be transferred to the authority of municipal 
organs, where it ‘will cease to be an instrument of state authority and can no longer be used 
for suppression [podavlenie] and oppression [ugnetenie]’.  Decentralisation of the militia 
would ensure that it could not be used for political purposes.   
Shakh also argued that the militia had to be freed from many of its previous 
obligations.  Police inquiries, which under the old system failed to uncover the truth and 
concealed wrongdoing and criminals, should become the responsibility of special organs 
supervised by jurists.  Likewise, the issuing of identity cards would be cheaper for the 
population if carried out by domestic and civic committees and officials of the municipal 
administration.  And various certificates would be more accurate if overseen by special civic 
boards.  Supervision of sanitary equipment and the quality of foodstuffs would be more 
effective under the control of public, worker, and professional organisations.  What, then, did 
this leave for the militia?  Shakh answered as follows:  ‘Protection of the safety and 
inviolability of citizens.  I would even say -- to assist citizens in the business of protecting 
                                                 
11 Rabochaia gazeta, 8 March 1917, p. 2. 
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their safety’.12  This position clearly differed from the role of the militia outlined in the 
Provisional Government statute of 17 April, which had envisaged a militia that retained 
responsibility for issuing identity cards, carrying out sanitary checks, and so forth (i.e., an 
apparatus to support a ‘well-ordered police state’).  For Shakh, the new police system should 
have a more restricted role and not be considered part of a state system of general regulation. 
Similar sentiments were expressed by M. Krushinskii, writing in the Socialist 
Revolutionary newspaper Delo naroda in response to the Provisional Government’s statute.  
Krushinskii asserted that, whilst the militia was important for ensuring ‘calm and order … its 
jurisdiction and authority must be strictly limited’ in order to prevent ‘the possibility of the 
militia threatening the freedom of the population, the possibility of a revival of a “cadre of 
neighbourhood autocrats”, which the [previous] police system was’.  This could not be 
achieved simply by limiting the militia’s remit;  it would also have to be subject to the 
authority of local self-government, to ensure that power did not become concentrated in the 
head of the militia.  In other words, the militia must have a ‘strictly democratic structure’.  
The problem with the Provisional Government’s statute, in Krushinskii’s view, was that it 
defined the militia as an executive organ of the state, and its ‘jurisdiction completely 
corresponds to the jurisdiction of the previous police system’.  This entailed a wide range of 
functions that would be better fulfilled by organs of local self-government.13 
Contributors to the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary press therefore provided 
an alternative conceptualisation of the militia, its functions and scope.  The key elements 
were democratic accountability within the militia, alongside its decentralisation to municipal 
authorities in order to prevent political misuse of the policing apparatus by the state, and a 
narrower set of functions than those formally granted by the Provisional Government’s 
statute.  This position therefore reflected the original priority of the militias that were formed 
during the February Revolution to guarantee order and the safety of citizens.  As a model of 
policing, we can also note that, in its emphasis on ‘policing by consent’ and ensuring the 
safety of citizens, this view of the militia had much in common with the Peelite idea of a 
preventive police. 
 Finally, another distinctive perspective on the militia was provided by the Bolsheviks.  
Throughout 1917 the Bolsheviks argued that the militia was one of the main instruments by 
which the working class could exercise power, prevent counter-revolution, and guarantee its 
freedom from oppression.  In other words, they viewed the militia in exclusive class terms;  
                                                 
12 Rabochaia gazeta, 2 June 1917, pp. 2-3. 
13 Delo naroda, 16 May 1917, p. 1. 
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its central purpose was to protect and advance the interests of the proletariat.  This was not 
simply ideological rhetoric that bore no correspondence to reality:  after the February 
Revolution there was an organisational distinction between the municipal militia and the 
myriad voluntary workers’ militias based in and around factories, including, from April, the 
Red Guards.  For the Bolsheviks, it was those specific sections of the militia that should 
become Russia’s new permanent police force:  ‘It is not a temporary organisation for the 
needs of the moment’, asserted Pravda as early as 8 March 1917, ‘It is a workers’ army, self-
governing and holding in its hands the order in worker districts’.  This workers’ army, 
continued Pravda, provided the ‘certainty that freedom is not an empty phrase but a living 
reality’.  The ‘fundamental defect’ of the new municipal militia was the fact that it was 
organised by the ‘old municipal administration’, which created conflict between municipal 
and district militiamen;  the only way to organise the militia was ‘from below, self-
organisation’.14  Nor was the notion of the militia as a proletarian ‘army’ a mere figure of 
speech for the Bolsheviks.  During 1917 they consistently argued that only a well-armed 
people could defend its freedom, a task that in the meantime fell to the workers’ militias and 
Red Guards.  Calling for an ‘army of the proletariat’, a ‘Red guard of the proletariat’, 
Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich -- brother of the tsarist military commander Mikhail -- pointed to 
Switzerland as an example of a country where freedom was guaranteed not by a standing 
army but by a popular militia.15    
 These points were elaborated by Lenin in an article for Pravda published on 20 April, 
seventeen days after his return to Russia from exile.  The essence of Lenin’s comments on the 
militia was that the people should govern and police themselves.  But for the Bolshevik 
leader, the ‘people’ (narod) meant specifically the proletariat (as well as the poorest strata of 
the peasantry), and the question of the militia’s status was part of a struggle between classes.  
In Lenin’s view, the government of landowners and capitalists was trying to make the militia 
accountable to it, to make the militia stand ‘apart from the people’.  This had to be countered 
by a ‘universal arming of the people’, by a militia that was not separate from the police and 
the army, but replaced them entirely.  Rejecting the Menshevik position that it was 
unnecessary to arm the proletariat, Lenin argued that unless ‘workers and soldiers can blend 
into a single national militia’, the old ‘apparatus of oppression will remain in place’, ready to 
serve the aims of counter-revolution.  This was also, for Lenin, part of the process of building 
                                                 
14 Pravda, 8 March 1917, p. 2. 
15 Pravda, 18 March 1917, p. 2. 
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a new state apparatus from below, which was necessary for the protection and advancement 
of the revolution. 
 
To replace the old organs of oppression -- police, bureaucracy, standing army -- 
with a universal arming of the people, actually a universal militia, this is the only 
way to guarantee, to the greatest extent, against restoration of monarchy, and to 
make possible a systematic, firm and decisive move towards socialism, not by 
‘bringing it in’ from above but by raising the enormous masses of proletarians and 
semi-proletarians to the art of state administration, to the direction of all state 
authority.16 
 
Lenin developed this argument in more detail in his pamphlet State and Revolution (written 
during August and September 1917 but not published until 1918), notably in chapter three 
where he discussed Marx’s analysis of the Paris Commune and its lessons for the 
organisation of a post-revolutionary state.  
 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Bolsheviks were highly critical of the 
Provisional Government’s description of the militia as an ‘executive organ of state power’ 
which, they argued, was tantamount to a restoration of the tsarist police system in all but 
name.  Shortly after the publication of the Provisional Government’s statute on the militia, 
Pravda called for a ‘decisive struggle against the restoration of the old type of police under 
the new name of militia’, which, it claimed, the Kadets were instigating, along with other 
‘capitalist parties’, and even with the compliance of the Narodniks (i.e., Socialist 
Revolutionaries) and Mensheviks.  Instead, what Pravda described as a ‘militia of the police 
type’ should be replaced by ‘compulsory public-militia service of all adult citizens of both 
sexes’.  Citizens would work in shifts in this militia, whilst retaining their main occupations;  
it would be self-governing, based on the elective principle, and have access to arms.17  
Similarly, a city-wide conference of Petrograd worker-militiamen on 27 May, organised by 
Vyborg district Bolsheviks, expressed its objection to the municipal militia headed by 
Kryzhanovskii because its purpose was ‘the full restoration, under the title of militia, of a 
police force of the west European type, hated by the majority of people across the world, 
mainly the poorest classes’ (Erykalov, p. 75).  This underscored the extent to which, for the 
Bolsheviks during 1917, the militia question was fundamentally about the location of power 
                                                 
16 Pravda, 20 April 1917, pp. 1-2. 
17 Pravda, 7 May 1917, p. 3. 
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in the context of class struggle;  the party’s focus was less on the specific functions and scope 
of the militia, more on its relationship to the state and the people.  Ultimately the militia had 
to become a different kind of organisation altogether from that envisaged by the Bolsheviks’ 
political adversaries. 
 One of the few Bolshevik statements about the militia during 1917 to provide any 
detail about what its practical tasks might be -- aside from the general task of defending the 
revolution -- was provided by M. Vatin, a Bolshevik activist, pamphleteer, and member of the 
editorial boards of both Pravda and Izvestiia (more widely known by his pseudonym, V. A. 
Bystrianskii).  In a pamphlet published in spring 1917, entitled Not the Police, but a National 
Militia, Vatin echoed Lenin’s position on the militia.  He argued that the revolutionary 
struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat was partly a struggle between different 
conceptions of the state, one in which the people would suffer oppression at the hands of the 
army, bureaucracy, and police, and one in which the people would exercise real power by 
running the state apparatus themselves.  In the latter model, the police would be replaced by a 
national militia:  ‘Power must belong to all the people, not in word but in deed;  organised 
and armed, the people must rule’ (Vatin, p. 3).  Although Vatin did not explicitly enumerate 
the specific functions of a national militia, he referred throughout the pamphlet to the crises 
in housing and the supply of bread and other basic necessities: 
 
A national militia means that the wealthy classes will no longer have privileges 
in the matter of receipt of products, that supervision of the distribution of 
products will not remain on paper [na bumage], that supervision of the sanitary 
conditions of life and labour will not be a simple innocent wish.  Citizens 
themselves, called to compulsory service in the militia, will deal better with the 
matter of protecting order and safety in the country, with sanitary supervision, 
with the distribution of products, than a professional police force that is alien to 
the people and isolated from it (Vatin, p. 10). 
 
Vatin also stressed that women should serve in the militia, although perhaps he perpetuated a 
gender stereotype in suggesting that women would be ‘excellent’ at dealing with ‘sanitary 
and hygiene’ matters, as well as the ‘distribution of products’ (Vatin, p. 10).  But in providing 
some insight into what a new militia might actually do, he emphasised how it could empower 
people to address their immediate practical needs. 
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 After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks’ radical vision of civilian policing was 
quickly tempered by the exigencies of rising crime, nascent civil war and deepening 
economic crisis.  The new regime’s initial aim was to expand the number of workers’ 
militias.  On 28 October the Internal Affairs Commissariat instructed local soviets to establish 
their own militias, staffed on a part-time basis by workers who would retain their main 
occupations;  along with the Red Guards, they would be responsible for civilian policing 
(Prokopenko and Romanov, pp. 16, 22).  On 2 December the Provisional Government’s 
militia structure was formally abolished (Mulukaev, p. 96).  During 1918, however, as a 
result of several interconnected processes -- all linked to early Bolshevik state-building -- the 
militia was transformed into a centralised state organ:  the Red Guards were absorbed into the 
nascent Red Army; the constitution of the Soviet republic (July 1918) effectively ended the 
autonomy of local soviets and, by extension, their militias; and in October 1918 a new 
department of the Internal Affairs Commissariat, Glavmilitsiia, was established to run what 
would now be a professional and permanently-staffed police force. 
 On 20 October 1918 the Internal Affairs and Justice commissariats published a 
Decree on the Organisation of the Soviet Worker-Peasant Militia (Instructions), signed by 
Grigorii Petrovskii (Internal Affairs commissar) and Dmitrii Kurskii (Justice commissar).18  
This was the first full statement from the Soviet government regarding the functions and 
scope of the militia.  The decree’s opening sentence explained that the ‘instructions’ were 
intended as a ‘temporary measure’ to deal with ‘extraordinary conditions’ and to protect the 
‘revolutionary order’.  Article 2 described the militia as ‘an executive organ of the Worker-
Peasant Central power in the localities, under the direct authority of local Soviets, and subject 
to the general direction of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs’.  This formulation 
was almost identical to the corresponding part of the Provisional Government statute, with 
the substitution of ‘Worker-Peasant Central power’ for ‘state power’, and of ‘local Soviets’ 
for ‘zemstva and municipal public administrations’.  In fact, the decree in most respects 
appears to be little more than a revised version of the Provisional Government statute, 
updated to reflect the advent of Soviet power but largely unchanged in its essentials.  This is 
particularly apparent in the section that described the areas for which the Soviet militia was to 
have authority (articles 25-28). 
                                                 
18 Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporiazhenii rabochego i krest’ianskogo pravitel’stva, 20 October 1918 




 Article 25 reasserted the Bolsheviks’ class-based view of the militia and its overall 
role:  ‘The Soviet Militia guards the interests of the working class and poorest peasants.  Its 
main responsibility is protection of the revolutionary order and civilian safety’ (the 
corresponding part of the Provisional Government statute, article 18, required the militia to 
protect all citizens).  The decree’s similarity to the earlier statute was evident in article 26, 
which listed the tasks of the militia in more detail.  Like the Provisional Government’s 
version, it contained ten points, quoted here in full:  
 
The militia has authority for: 
(1) Preventing and combatting violations of the order established by Soviet power, 
its decrees and instructions;  
(2) Strictly supervising the implementation by all citizens of the decrees, laws and 
instructions of Central Worker-Peasant power with regard to record-keeping, 
distribution, and observance of fixed prices relating to the products of 
industry and agriculture (bread monopoly, distribution of fabrics, etc.); 
(3) Timely notification of the population about instructions of the Soviet 
authorities; 
(4) Assisting the Soviet authorities by implementing the obligations placed on 
them; 
(5) Drawing up of documents and reports about violations of order, crimes, 
misdemeanours and incidents, both those discovered by the Militia itself and 
those made known to it by institutions and individuals; 
  Note: supplementary instructions about the correct way of drawing up 
reports will follow. 
(6)  Supervising the fulfilment of sanitary regulations and measures undertaken by 
the People’s Commissariat of Public Health and local organs of Soviet power; 
(7)  Safeguarding order in public places, as well as ensuring the good condition of 
roads, bridges, brushwood roads, streets, squares and so on, and supervising 
the traffic on them; 
(8) Taking measures for maintaining safety and order during fires, floods and 
other public disasters, as well as providing help in unfortunate accidents; 
(9)  Issuing of identity cards, labour books [trudovye knigi] and other certificates, 
information, notices and testimonies, in circumstances allowed for by 
instructions of the Central Worker-Peasant authority;   
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(10) Calling on citizens to render help in the event of public disasters, unfortunate 
accidents and individual counter-revolutionary manifestations. 
 
Each of these points, for the most part, replicated the Provisional Government’s list of militia 
responsibilities.  In both documents -- Bolshevik decree and Provisional Government statute -
- point 1 required the militia to enforce law and order.  Points 7-10 of the Bolshevik decree 
were almost identical to the corresponding parts of the Provisional Government statute 
(although the order in which they were listed was slightly different).  In points 8 and 9 the 
word translated here as ‘public’ was obshchestvennyi in the April 1917 statute;  Petrovskii 
and Kurskii (or officials in their commissariats) substituted the word narodnyi for the updated 
version of October 1918, which in Russian has a more populist connotation than 
obshchestvennyi, but in terms of the militia’s ascribed tasks, this minor amendment had little 
practical significance.  Only points 2 and 6, covering economic distribution and health 
matters, were substantively new and obviously reflected specific priorities of the Bolshevik 
regime (incidentally, both were matters that Vatin had alluded to in his pamphlet of spring 
1917).  They replaced points 3 and 6 from the Provisional Government statute:  the militia 
was no longer enjoined to protect civil freedoms or to maintain population registers.  The 
remaining articles in the section of the decree that set out the militia’s areas of authority 
related to procedures for criminal investigation. 
 By only modifying the Provisional Government statute, rather than producing an 
entirely new one based on radical ideas about the militia enunciated by the Bolsheviks during 
1917, the decree of October 1918 indicated that the role of the militia would remain largely 
unchanged, at least in terms of its formally ascribed functions.  The militia would be an 
instrument of public administration, with responsibility not only for law and order, but for a 
range of welfare and supervisory matters -- an apparatus for a ‘well-ordered police state’ of 
the standard European type.  How are we to account for the strong current of continuity in 
how policing was formally conceptualised after the October Revolution, especially in view of 
the divergent position on the militia taken by the Bolsheviks during 1917?   
 First of all, it seems clear that the militia’s status and functions were determined by 
the urgent imperatives of state-building during 1918.  As the Bolsheviks confronted rising 
crime, civil war, foreign intervention and economic chaos, they could ill-afford to leave 
matters of law and order, as well as the broader supervision of economy and society, to a 
plethora of autonomous, self-organising and semi-professional units.  In that context, the 
appeal of the ‘well-ordered police state’ with a centralised apparatus to enforce and supervise 
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a wide range of government measures seems obvious.  The Provisional Government’s statute 
provided a ready-made description of what such an ‘executive police’ would mean in 
practice;  and we cannot dismiss the possibility that, in the midst of growing crisis, there was 
simply insufficient time to write an entirely new decree;  the priority was to provide shape 
and purpose to the militia as a centralised unitary police system, and an amended version of 
the April 1917 statute would suffice.  Secondly, the creation of the Cheka in December 1917, 
as a political security police tasked with combatting counter-revolution and sabotage 
(Leggett, p. 17), implied that, in theory, the militia would remain a conventional civilian 
police force;  its functions and scope could remain largely unchanged because the Cheka 
would deal with ‘extraordinary’ matters.  But the militia nevertheless required clarification of 
its role under the Soviet government, hence the publication of the October 1918 decree.   
 In practice, as the civil war intensified, the militia worked closely with the Cheka, and 
the operational lines of distinction between the two organisations were blurred (Hagenloh, pp. 
28-29).  After the civil war, the role of the militia continued to develop beyond the functions 
delineated in the October 1918 decree.  In 1930 it was amalgamated with the political 
security police and became increasingly involved, as an active participant, in the ‘social 
engineering’ of the Stalin period (Hagenloh).  To some extent, this was prefigured by the 
concept of the militia as component of a ‘well-ordered police state’, a concept that survived 
intact during 1917-18;  ideas about the functions and scope of the militia after the revolution, 
however, are beyond the purview of this article. 
 
This article has considered some of the main commentaries and statements about the militia 
during 1917-18 in order to gauge how far the Russian Revolution transformed ideas about the 
functions and scope of policing.  The evidence suggests that, despite the potentially radical 
implications of the centrifugal militia system that existed during the first year of the 
revolution, most of the main political actors advocated conventional models of policing.  By 
way of conclusion, I would like to emphasise the ostensible commonalities that most of these 
ideas had with wider European concepts of policing.  Following the rapid improvisation of 
militias during the February Revolution, the discourse about the purpose of the new police 
system (as well as its structure and relationship to the authorities) echoed long-standing 
European models.  The liberal stance taken by Lenskii and encapsulated in the Provisional 
Government statute of April 1917 envisaged the militia as a public administrative apparatus, 
much in line with the Cameralist principles that underpinned the development of continental 
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European police systems from the seventeenth century onwards (including that of tsarist 
Russia).   
 The Bolsheviks’ concept of the militia as ‘the people in arms’, clearly the most radical 
position in 1917, derived to some extent from their understanding of the Paris Commune, but 
after the October Revolution the model of the ‘well-ordered police state’ quickly regained 
favoured status.  Other contributors to the debate expressed strong reservations about both of 
these concepts:  a centralised ‘executive police’ was potentially an instrument of oppression;  
and arming the people was unnecessary because the military already supported the 
revolution.  Instead, the militia should be a decentralised, democratically accountable police 
force, and its main task should be to protect the safety of citizens.  These views were similar 
to the Peelite model of a preventive police that gained favour in Britain during the nineteenth 
century.  The same might also be said of the improvised voluntary militias that proliferated 
after the collapse of tsarism, with the caveat that they acted from necessity (to restore order) 
and, for the most part, without extended reflection on the organisational principles that 
motivated them. 
 None of this is to deny that the revolutionary discourse about policing had its own 
internal dynamic.  Clearly the question about the purpose of the militia was closely bound up 
with real concerns about order, crime, and hooliganism, and it also reflected competing 
notions of the relationship between state and society, as well as different political ideologies.  
But it also intersected with a wider context, namely the pan-European historical development 
of policing.  Viewed from that perspective, the revolution did not transform ideas about 
policing (at least in the short-term), but it did create a public arena in which different models 
from the European (including Russian) experience could be discussed and advocated.  The 
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